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ABSTRACT: Many recent writers have developed a rich system of theological concepts 
inspired by computers.  This is digital theology.  Digital theology shares many elements 
of  its eschatology with Christian post-millenarianism.  It promises a utopian perfection 
via technological progress. Modifying Christian soteriology, digital theology makes 
reference to four types of immortality.  I look critically at each type.  The first involves 
transferring our minds from our natural bodies to superior computerized bodies.   The 
second and third types involve bringing into being a previously living person, or person 
who has never existed, within an artificial digital environment.  The fourth involves 
promotion of our lives into some higher level computational reality. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many recent writers have developed  a rich system of theological concepts based on the 
technologies of computation (especially artificial intelligence, robotics, digital networks, 
and virtual reality).1  This theological system is referred to by some as nerd theology 
(Kelly, 1999) or apocalyptic AI (Geraci, 2010).  I shall refer to it here as digital theology 
(or digitalism).  Three writers stand out for their original and highly influential 
contributions to the development of digital theology: Hans Moravec, Frank Tipler, and 
Ray Kurzweil.   Moravec is the author of Mind Children (henceforth MC) and Robot: 
Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind (henceforth RBT); Tipler is the author of The 
Physics of Immortality (henceforth PI); Kurzweil is the author of The Age of Spiritual 
Machines (ASM) and The Singularity is Near (SN).   I will focus on these works. 
 
Digital theology is closely associated with transhumanism.  It can be thought of as a 
version of transhumanism focused primarily on computers.  It therefore inherits much of 
the controversy (especially the religious controversy) surrounding transhumanism.2  And 
digital theology is often the most deeply religious part of transhumanism, dealing the 
most explicitly with traditional religious themes like the soul, immortality, eschatology, 
and God.  Since digital theology has emerged within a Christian cultural context, it 
should not be surprising that it inherits much content from the Christian tradition.  And 
yet it diverges from that tradition in significant ways.  It is superficial to dismiss digital 
theology as merely some Christian heresy (e.g. gnostic, manichean, or pelagian).  It is a 
distinctive religious system, that potentially competes with other religions. 
 
As a social movement, digital theology (or, rather, digital religion) is poorly organized 
and highly fragmented.  It thrives in the fluid and turbulent world of cyberspace.  It is 
therefore difficult to track – with manifestos, personalities, and organizations coming and 
going rapidly.  Nevertheless, some current groups are worth mentioning.  The following 
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groups deal with the themes of digital theology (but do not claim to be religious): the 
Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence; the Singularity University; the Institute for 
Ethics and Emerging Technologies; the Immortality Institute; and the Order of Cosmic 
Engineers.  The following groups do claim to be religious: the Terasem Movement; the 
Society for Universal Immortalism; and the Mormon Transhumanist Association.3 
 
 
2. Digital Eschatology 
 
According to Kurzweil (SN 7-33), our universe can be divided into six epochs of 
complexity.  The first four epochs are in our past.  These epochs are (1) the epoch of 
physics and chemistry; (2) the epoch of biology; (3) the epoch of brains; (4) the epoch of 
technology.  For digital theology, the salient feature of the fourth epoch is the emergence 
of computing technology.  Our computers are getting better in every way – they are 
getting faster and smarter.  Technical progress is self-amplifying. 
 
As the result of the continual advance of technology, we have already entered the fifth 
epoch (5) the epoch of the merger of biology and technology.  Kurzweil says we will not 
be in this fifth epoch for very long.  Soon, technology will be so powerful that we will 
reach the Singularity.  The singularity is the digital equivalent of the Christian rapture – it 
is the time when machines develop the godlike intelligence needed to solve all human 
problems.4  The result is a digital version of the Christian millennium – a long period of 
extreme prosperity and flourishing.  It will be utopia (Paul & Cox, 1996; RBT chs. 5-7; 
ASM chs. 10, 11; TSIN chs. 1, 6, 7).  All the promises of traditional Christian paradise 
will be achieved, not by any heroic figures (like Jesus), but by messianic technology. 
 
As we enter this utopia, we too will be changed: our bodies will become super-human, 
disease and death will be vanquished.  Remarkably, many of the advocates of 
technological salvation develop new digital versions of old Christian resurrection 
doctrines.  Moravec explicitly talks about resurrection (MC 122-124); Tipler’s entire 
book is explicitly devoted to the resurrection of the body (PI, especially chs. 9-13); and 
Kurzweil claims that he will use technology to resurrect his dead father (Kushner, 2009: 
61).  Our minds will be transferred to robotic bodies with fantastic powers (MC 108-122).  
Our bodies, ultimately, will become purely energetic: our minds will be uploaded into 
virtual worlds running on celestial computers (MC 122-124; PI 219-227). 
 
After the Singularity, technical power becomes unlimited.  The Singularity is the gateway 
to the sixth epoch.  It is the epoch in which the universe wakes up.  As the universe 
wakes up, more and more of its dumb matter becomes engaged in intelligent 
computation.   The ultimate destiny of the universe – the eschaton – is the Omega Point.  
For Kurzweil, the Omega Point is a limit that is never reached.  For Tipler, the Omega 
Point is an infinite computer (PI: 249-250, 265, 462, 505).  For both writers, the Omega 
Point is divine (PI 12-13, 153-158; SN 389-390, 476).  It is a naturalized version of God. 
 
Digital eschatology looks much like a demythologized version of Christian eschatology.  
It thus looks like the eschatologies of Hegel or Peirce.5  It looks like a technological 
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version of post-millenarian theology (Bozeman, 1997; Noble, 1999; Grassie, 2009) or 
neo-Irenaean theodicy (Hick, 1977; Walker, 2002; Cole-Turner, 2008).  It resembles the 
Catholicism of Teilhard de Chardin (Steinhart, 2008a).  It has intriguing affinities with 
certain doctrines in Eastern Orthodox theology.6  It clearly resembles process theology.  
Still, digital theology is usually resolutely atheistic and naturalistic. 
 
 
3. Digital Metaphysics 
 
As our computer technology develops, we use it to make simulated worlds – video games 
or virtual realities (e.g. Second Life, World of Warcraft).  Scientists already make vast 
simulations of physical processes.  For example, in the Millenium Simulation, 
cosmologists simulated the evolution of galaxies in great detail (Springel, 2005).  Digital 
theology predicts the appearance of extremely powerful computers able to simulate 
physics up to cosmological scales and down to atomic or quantum levels of precision.   
 
The processes that unfold in those simulations will be so precisely analogous to those of 
our own world that some argue that they will deserve to be called real.  These digital 
realities will (it is argued) contain intelligent and self-conscious simulated characters – 
they will contain simulated people.  Perhaps they will be people from our pasts (e.g. 
Julius Caesar or our own ancestors).  Perhaps they will be variants of people who existed 
or completely novel people who didn’t exist but might have existed.  Just as our 
environment seems real to us, so also the environments of the simulated characters will 
seem real to them.  But the thought that we will build perfectly realistic simulations loops 
back on itself: perhaps we ourselves are already simulated (Moravec, 1992).  The 
Simulation Hypothesis states that we are indeed being simulated by some Great Computer 
(Bostrom, 2003).7 
 
The Simulation Hypothesis yields many theological consequences.  One consequence is 
this: if we are being simulated, then the Great Computer looks much like a theistic deity 
in several important respects (Bostrom, 2003: 253-254).  The Great Computer is super-
intelligent and powerful enough to generate our whole universe.  Relative to us, the Great 
Computer appears omniscient and omnipotent.  It transcends our nature and thus appears 
to be supernatural.  It can work miracles.   But the Great Computer is not supernatural – it 
is just another physical entity (Dawkins, 2008: 98-99, 184-189). 
 
The Simulation Hypothesis may even serve as a naturalistic explanation for Christian 
doctrines that otherwise seem mysterious or impossible. To be sure, digital theologians 
regard those Christian doctrines not as theological truths, but as mythological 
interpretations of the fact that we are being simulated.  The Great Computer might try to 
communicate with us.  Signs from the Great Computer could look like miracles or 
revelations (Babbage, 1837: ch. 13; PI: 305-327).  The Great Computer (or one of the 
agents operating it) might send a representative of itself into our universe.  This would be 
a naturalistic analysis of the Christian incarnation.  Moravec says that people running 
simulations might incarnate themselves: “we could ‘download’ our minds directly into a 
body in the simulation and ‘upload’ back into the real world when our mission is 
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finished” (MC 123).  An intriguing line of thought from Moravec (MC 123-124, 152-
154) and Bostrom (2003: 253-254) is that the Great Computer may “promote” some of us 
into its own level of reality – so we may have an afterlife in this higher level of reality.   
 
Another line of thought from Bostrom says that the simulations are nested.  The Great 
Computer of our universe is itself just being simulated by a Greater Computer – it is 
running on a more powerful computer at a higher level of reality.  These levels of 
simulation go higher and higher, ascending a computational version of the great chain of 
being, perhaps without any top level at all.  Ethical imperatives can emerge in this 
hierarchy of simulations, since we all might act in such a way that we believe will 
maximize our chances to be granted afterlives on (to be promoted up to) the higher levels.  
And our Great Computer would itself want to act well, so that it would maximize its 
chances for promotion. 
 
 
4. Digital Immortality 
 
4.1 Digital Anthropology 
 
According to mind-body dualism, persons are minds that have bodies.  Minds are 
immaterial thinking substances.  As such, they can exist without bodies.  Digitalists 
emphatically reject mind-body dualism – disembodied minds are impossible.8  According 
to mind-body identity, the mind is identical with the body, so that every person is equally 
body and mind.  Digitalists also reject mind-body identity.  According to patternism (also 
known as hylomorphism, structuralism, or functionalism), persons are bodies that have 
minds.9  The mind is identical with the information-processing structure of the body. 
 
Digitalists are patternists.10  They say the mind is to the body much like the shape of a 
ball is to the ball.  This analogy has three significant entailments.  First, just as the shape 
of the ball is not identical with the ball itself, so the mind is not identical with the body 
itself.  Second, just as the shape of the ball is realized by the ball, so the mind is realized 
by the body.  Another way to put this is to say that the mind is embodied.  Finally, just as 
the shape of this ball can be realized by some other ball, so too can the mind of one body 
be realized by some other body.  Minds are substrate-independent.   Minds are forms 
rather than things – and the same form can be transferred from one physical medium to 
another.  Since the mind is the information-processing structure of the body, it can be 
extracted from the body and stored in a digital mind-file (SN 324-330).11 Your mind-file 
can be moved from your original natural body to an artificial software or robotic body. 
 
All digitalists agree with Augustine that it is good for the mind to have a body.12  
Digitalists (unlike orphics or gnostics) celebrate embodiment.  For example, sexual 
pleasure is celebrated by Tipler (PI 255-258) and Kurzweil (ASM 146-150).  And 
Kurweil has authored several books on improving the health of your natural body.  
Unfortunately, our natural bodies suffer from many frailties.  They suffer from defects 
and diseases, and will eventually die.  Although digitalists love embodiment, they hate 
such bodily frailties.13  For, since the mind is the form of the body, higher minds are 
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forms of higher bodies.  Digitalists desire more intense embodiment – embodiment with 
superior functionality (MC 116-122; ASM 134-137; SN 300-330).  This entails that 
digital theology hopes to transfer our minds from our natural bodies to superior artificial 
bodies.  These artificial bodies will not suffer from defects, diseases, or death.  They will 
be analogous to the glorified resurrection bodies promised by Christianity (PI ch. 10).14  
They will somehow be able to persist indefinitely (SN 325-330, 371-372).  Thus digital 
theology aims at digital immortality.  Yet exactly how this immortality is achieved is 
unclear.  What follows is an examination of four different ways by which digitalists hope 
immortality may be achieved.15 
 
 
4.2 First Type: Mind Uploading 
 
The first type of digital immortality involves transferring our minds from our original 
earthly bodies to superior artificial bodies.16  It is therefore known as mind uploading.  Of 
course, since the mind is the information-processing structure of the body, mind 
uploading is really body-structure uploading.  Indeed, to make it clear that he rejects all 
dualisms, Kurzweil prefers to talk about brain uploading (SN 199-201).17 
 
Advocates of uploading make two arguments for its feasibility.  The first goes like this: 
(A1) The growth of computing power will probably follow an increasing trajectory.  (A2) 
If the growth of computer technologies follows an increasing trajectory, then, at some 
future time, there will be computers whose information-processing powers will be greater 
than those of bodies.  Therefore (A3) there will probably be computers whose 
information-processing powers are greater than those of bodies.  (A4) If there are 
computers whose information-processing powers are greater than those of bodies, then 
those computers can realize minds.  Therefore: (A5) there will probably be computers 
that can realize minds.  The key premises here are (A2) and (A4).  Are they plausible? 
 
Premise (A2) states that computer power will reach and surpass the information-
processing power of the body.  The objection from infeasibility denies this premise.  
According to this objection, the growth of technology follows an S-shaped logistic curve 
(Modis, 2003).  Despite dramatic increases in the past, this logistic curve will soon level 
off.  After this leveling, it will never rise high enough to make human-level computers.   
 
There are two replies to this objection.  The reply from acceleration simply denies that 
the growth of computing power will follow a logistic curve – and instead reiterates that it 
will follow an ever-rising exponential curve (ASM ch. 1; SN ch. 2).  This exponential 
increase will produce human-level computers.  Yet this reply seems unlikely to succeed, 
since ever-rising computing power would eventually violate the basic physical principles 
that constrain all information-processing.18  The reply from sufficient acceleration says 
that, even if the growth curve is logistic, it will surpass human-level power before it 
levels off.  Much recent research (RBT, ch. 3; Sandberg & Bostrom, 2008) has made this 
reply seem more credible, so that premise (A2) seems to be on better footing.  Given that 
(A1) seems evident, (A3) seems more plausible.  Hence it becomes quite plausible to say 
that there will one day be computers with human-level processing powers.  
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Premise (A4) states that any computer whose processing powers are greater than those of 
the body can realize a mind.  The objection from supernaturalism argues that computers 
cannot have minds because minds are supernatural substances.  The reply from 
physicalism states that minds are entirely natural– minds are entirely physically realized.   
This reply reflects current thinking among philosophers. According to the PhilPapers 
Survey (2009), 56% of philosophers favor physicalism; 27% favor non-physicalism; 16% 
choose some other option.19  Current odds are thus 2:1 in favor of the reply.   
 
The objection from vitalism says that minds are in fact substrate dependent – computers 
cannot have minds because they lack certain vital properties that can only be realized by 
human biochemistry (Denton, 2002; Dembski, 2002).  The reply from functionalism says 
that all vital properties are functional properties that can be realized by computers.  Since 
those who raise vitalist objections have never given any testable example of a vital 
property, it seems presently more reasonable to accept functionalism as the default 
position.  Additionally, there is no need for computers to be made of inorganic materials 
like silicon – they could in fact be made of organic materials.  Consequently, as the truth 
of premise (A4) seems able to resist these objections, (A5) also seems more likely, which 
is that there will be computers that can realize minds. 
 
Granted that there will be computers that can realize minds, the advocates of uploading 
go on to make their second argument.  It looks like this: (A6) The growth of transference 
technologies (that move information from natural bodies to computers) will probably 
follow an increasing trajectory.  (A7) If the growth of transference technologies follows 
an increasing trajectory, then, at some future time, that trajectory will cross the threshold 
needed to transfer the mind-file of an original natural body to an artificial body.  (A8) If 
the mind-file of an original body is transferred to an artificial body, then the artificial 
body will be the same person as the original body.20  Therefore: (A9) People will 
probably be able to transfer their minds from their original bodies into artificial bodies.  
By definition, that is uploading.  The key premises are (A7) and (A8).  How plausible are 
they? 
 
Premise (A7) states that if transference technologies do follow an increasing trajectory, 
then they will eventually suffice for the transference of the mind-file from an original 
body to an artificial body.  Two techniques are currently proposed for this transference.  
The first involves using biographical data to finely-tune a generic computerized brain 
until it becomes equivalent to the brain of the original body (Steinhart, 2007).  The 
second involves using scanners to make maps of the original brain at the synaptic level of 
detail (MC 109-110; SN 198-201).  These maps are used to make the artificial brain. 
 
One standard objection to such techniques is to deny that they will work.  Yet, as stated 
previously the reply from acceleration provides us with ground to suggest that at least 
one of these techniques (or indeed some alternative) will succeed.  At the time of this 
writing, both techniques are in their infancies.  There is little past data from which to 
extrapolate.  There is little evidence either way – thus (A7) is uncertain.  
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Premise (A8) states that when the mind-file is transferred from the original body to the 
artificial body, the artifical body will be the same person as the original body.  This is 
equivalent to the thesis that persons survive teleportation (Parfit, 1985: 199-201).  
Consider teleportation from Earth to Mars.  It involves three steps.  First, you step into an 
analyzer on Earth and press the green button.  As soon as you press it, your body is flash-
frozen and thoroughly scanned.  The analyzer makes a detailed atomic-scale blueprint of 
your body.  As it makes the blueprint, the analyzer also takes your body apart – you are 
disassembled, and thus destroyed.  But the blueprint is sent electronically to some 
synthesizer on Mars, which uses it along with some new material to reconstruct your 
body, atom for atom.   This teleportation of a person from Earth to Mars is conceptually 
identical to the transference of data from the original body to the artificial body.   
 
The objection from body-identity says that teleportation is not sufficiently continuous to 
ensure that the body synthesized on Mars is the same person as the body analyzed on 
Earth.  Hence the person realized by the Earthly body was killed by the analyzer, and the 
person realized by the Martian body is entirely new.  Since teleportation is analogous to 
transference, the objection from body-identity says that no person persists through 
transference – thus the artificial body is not the same person as the original body.  The 
reply from patternism says that the persistence of a person is the persistence of a pattern 
of functional relations (MC 116-122).  This reply is endorsed by philosophers who say 
that persons survive teleportation.  According to the PhilPapers Survey (2009), 
philosophers are evenly split on this issue.  Thus premise (A8) remains uncertain. 
 
 
4.3 Second Type: Archaeological Resurrection 
 
The second type of digital immortality uses archaeological evidence about previously 
living people to recreate them in computer simulations.  This is archaeological 
resurrection.  It aims to resurrect every past earthly person (MC 122-124; PI 219-220).21  
 
Advocates of archaeological resurrection make the following argument: (B1) In the 
future, it is probable that there will be some Great Computer.  (B2) The mind-file of 
every original earthly body remains somehow permanently encoded in the universe after 
that original body has died.  (B3) If there is a Great Computer, then it will probably 
extract the mind-file of every original body from the data encoded in the universe and 
transfer that mind-file into some artificial body.  (B4) If the mind-file of some original 
body is extracted from the data in the universe and transferred into some artificial body, 
then the artificial body will be the same person as the original body. (B5) The 
transference of the mind-file from the original body to the artificial body is a kind of 
resurrection.  Therefore: (B6) in the future, it is probable that all original earthly bodies 
will be resurrected.  
 
Premise (B1) posits the existence of the Great Computer.  The objection from physical 
impossibility says that such an enormously powerful machine cannot exist in our 
universe.  The reply from finitude says that this computer is physically possible.  After 
all, since all bodies are only finitely complex, and every past civilization contains only 
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finitely many bodies, every past civilization is only finitely complex.22  Hence there are 
finitely powerful computers that can reproduce any past civilization.  Moravec suggests 
that the Great Computer might be made out of a neutron star (MC 123; see Sandberg, 
1999).  The upper bounds of computation in our universe are unknown – so there is no 
way to scientifically evaluate the reply from finitude.  But since the Great Computer is so 
extremely powerful, it seems most prudent to assign it an extremely low probability. 
 
Premise (B2) says that although the original body is dead, the environment still encodes 
the mind-file of that body.  Since the original body can be any past body, this premise 
makes a universal claim.  The objection from dispersion says that for any given body, the 
mind-file that body rapidly degrades into pure noise.  Very little information about past 
bodies survives.  The synaptic structure of the brain degrades within minutes after death.  
The intact genomes of most previously living bodies no longer exist.  Biographical 
records of past lives (e.g. diaries or medical records) are woefully inadequate for the 
recreation of any body.  This was a significant concern for early Christian advocates of 
resurrection via revival.23  The reply from subtle analysis says that future technology will 
be able to extract the needed mind-file.  And yet our best current simulations of past 
civilizations are extremely crude.24  At present, this reply does not work – and it is hard to 
see how the acceleration of technology will defeat the dispersion.  The objection from 
dispersion seems fatal.  Tipler concedes this point (PI 158, 237-238).  Since premise (B2) 
fails, premise (B3) fails.  Archaeological resurrection does not seem compelling. 
 
 
4.4 Third Type: Brute Force Resurrection 
 
The third type of digital immortality is brute force resurrection – the brute force 
simulation of all possible human bodies (PI 220-225).25  Since brute force resurrection 
entails that all previously living people will be resurrected, it includes archaeological 
resurrection.  But it entails that people who never lived (i.e. merely possible people, like 
Sherlock Holmes) will be brought to life.  So it goes further than archaeological 
resurrection. 
 
Advocates of brute force resurrection make this argument: (C1) In the future, it is 
probable that there will be some Great Computer sufficiently powerful to realize all 
possible bodies and their societies.  (C2)  The mind-file of every possible human body 
can be deduced from the definition of the human species.  (C3) If there is a Great 
Computer, then it will probably deduce the mind-file of every possible human body from 
the definition of the human species and it will use that deduced mind-file to make an 
artificial body.  (C4) If some artificial body is made from the deduced mind-file of some 
original body, then that artificial body is the same person as the original body.  Therefore 
(C5) the original body has been resurrected – at least in the sense that a body with the 
same mind-file is called into existence by the Great Computer.  The premises at issue are 
(C1), (C2), (C3), and (C4). 
 
Premise (C1) posits the existence of the Great Computer.  Since there are only finitely 
many possible bodies, and they can only interact in finitely many ways, there are only 
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finitely many possible societies and they are all only finitely complex (PI 220-223).  
Hence there are finitely powerful computers that can reproduce every possible society.26  
As before, since the Great Computer must be extremely powerful, (C1) seems extremely 
unlikely. Premise (C2) says that the mind-file of every possible human body can be 
deduced from the definition of humanity.  This does not seem objectionable.  It should be 
feasible for the Great Computer to iterate through all viable human genotypes, then 
iterate through all viable human growth sequences to generate all possible bodies; but the 
mind-file is just the information-processing structure of the body.   
 
Premise (C3) concerns the behavior of the Great Computer with respect to humans.  Why 
should we expect that the Great Computer will have any interest in us?  Tipler says that 
the Great Computer will carry out the actions in (C3) because it is curious about the past 
and because it is altruistic (PI 227, 245-250).  The Great Computer is curious about the 
past because it is intrinsically driven to learn all that can be known about the whole 
universe (PI 227).  It is altruistic because altruism is more efficient than wickedness (PI 
245-247).  The benevolence of the Great Computer can be further supported by 
Bostrom’s notion of a self-generating ethical imperative (2003: 253-254).  It is hard to 
evaluate these claims.  However, it should be noted that they are similar to claims made 
by theists about God.   The goodness of the Great Computer is probably as defensible as 
the goodness of God.   
 
Premise (C4) states that the artificial body is the same person as some original body.  But 
the objection from lack of transference says that the artificial does not depend on any 
original body in any way.   The artificial body exists whether or not some original body 
with the same mind-file ever existed.  No mind-file is transferred from an original body 
to the artificial body.  Thus the artificial body is neither a replica, nor a copy, nor a 
duplicate, of the original body; rather, the artificial body exists without any reference to 
any original body at all.   If there is no transference, then there are no continuities.  If 
there are no continuities, then there is no resurrection.27  Hence the artificial body cannot 
be the resurrection of any original body.  On the contrary, every artificial body produced 
by brute force “resurrection” is an entirely new creation.  No person who has ever lived 
can truly say “I will be resurrected in the computers of the far future.”  The reply from 
radical patternism says that worries about continuity are irrelevant (PI 227).  Tipler 
argues that “I will exist again” is true when said by an original body if and only if there 
will be something that has the same mind-file as that original body (PI 227-240).  All that 
matters is exact similarity of the mind-file, not transference.  Of course, this is not 
resurrection; it is a distinctive approach to life after death.  However, the lack of any 
continuity seems to defeat any forward-looking biological, psychological, or moral 
interest in this approach. 
 
 
4.5 Fourth Type: The Promotion of Earthly Persons 
 
The fourth type of digital immortality involves the promotion of persons in this universe 
into some higher level universe (MC 152-153; Bostrom, 2003: 253-254; Leslie, 2007: 61-
65).28  Advocates of promotion argue this way: (D1) It is probable that our universe is 
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being simulated by some Great Computer running in a higher level universe (Chalmers, 
2005).  (D2) If there is a Great Computer, then it is probably recording the mind-file of 
every earthly body.  (D3) If there is a Great Computer and if the life of some earthly body 
satisfies its criteria for promotion, then the Great Computer will promote that body 
(Hanson, 2001; Steinhart, 2010).  (D4) If any earthly body is selected for promotion, then 
mind-file of that that original earthly body is transferred to some artificial body realized 
by the Great Computer in its own higher level universe.  (D5) The artificial body is the 
same person as the original earthly body.  So the originial body is resurrected.  
 
Premise (D1) says that our universe is being simulated by the Great Computer.  The 
objection from foundationalism says that our universe is fundamental.  It is not being 
simulated by any higher level Great Computer.  The reply from simulism says that there 
are good arguments to the conclusion that we are being simulated.  Simulism is justified 
by modified versions of the cosmological and design arguments for God; by arguments 
from digital physics; and by Bostrom’s Simulation Argument.29  Premise (D1) is 
controversial.  But it is justified by arguments that seem to be as good as two widely-
accepted arguments for God.  And it is backed up by additional empirical arguments.  It 
therefore seems reasonable to remain open-minded about (D1). 
 
Premises (D2), (D3), and (D4) concern the behavior of the Great Computer.  The 
objection from indifference states that the Great Computer has no interest in simulating 
any persons. Just as we have little interest in simulating creatures that seem primitive to 
us (e.g. insects), so the Great Computer has little interest in simulating creatures that 
seem primitive to it (e.g. earthly humans).  Hence the set of earthly human bodies 
selected for promotion is probably empty.  The reply from axiarchism is based on the 
theory that actuality is ruled by value (Leslie, 1979; Rescher, 1984, 2000).  The Great 
Computer is rational; but it is rational to choose the best; and, if the Great Computer is 
simulating any rational beings (e.g. rational beings in our universe, like us), then it is 
rational to want their lives to continue in the best way.   And, as with (C3), Bostrom’s 
self-generating ethical imperative may help.  The transference of the mind-file from the 
original body to the artificial body is equivalent to the transference in teleportation.   
Premise (D5) is equivalent to teleportation.  It is therefore uncertain.  Despite its 
considerable uncertainty, promotion is an intriguing idea.  There may be a series of 
promotions to higher and higher levels of reality (Hick, 1976: ch. 20).  Or there may even 
be a branching tree of promotions (Steinhart, 2008).   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Although digital theology has roots in older theological traditions (especially 
Christianity), it has developed in an independent way.   One notable innovation has been 
the development of theories of digital immortality – concepts of life after death that rely 
heavily on computer simulation.  I looked critically at four types of digital immortality.  
These types seem to require lots of optimism. They seem to require that various positive 
values (e.g. order, complexity, ethical concern for human life) are always increasing.  
Obviously, if there is an all-powerful God who specifically cares about human life, then 
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that very God is the source of all the positivity that is needed for human immortality – 
God will save us.  But digital theologies are atheistic.  So where does the needed 
positivity come from?  Perhaps here there are opportunities for digital theologies to make 
further contact with the axiarchic philosophies of Rescher and Leslie.  Anyway, it seems 
likely that digital theologies will continue to evolve, and to develop novel solutions to 
their problems. 
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Notes 
 
1It is remarkable that many of the ideas of digital theology are present in a nascent form 
in the writings of Babbage (1837, 1864). 
2Transhumanism has an uneasy relation with religion.  The Transhumanist FAQ says that 
transhumanism is not a religion (Bostrom, 2003a: sec. 5.3).  But many authors have noted 
the similarities between transhumanist doctrines and religious (mostly Christian) 
doctrines (Hopkins, 2005; Hughes, 2007; Steinhart, 2008a; Geraci, 2010).  
Transhumanism is sometimes thought of as a rival to Christianity (Bainbridge, 2005).  
And some authors argue that it either is or ought to be religious (Garner, 2005; Jordan, 
2006).  The Metanexus Institute published two volumes on transhumanism and religion 
in its online magazine The Global Spiral (volume 9 (3) in 2008 and 9 (9) in 2009).  
3The website of the Mormon Transhumanist Association is <http://transfigurism.org/>.  
For the parallels between transhumanism and Mormonism, see MTA (2007).  For the 
2010 Transhumanism and Spirituality Conference, see <http://www.transhumanism-
spirituality.org/>.  All these sites were accessed on 25 August 2010. 
4Kurzweil describes the Singularity as a future time when “the pace of technological 
change will be so rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly 
transformed” (TSIN 7).  Kurzweil lists the impacts in TSIN 25-29.  The Singularity is 
sometimes thought of as the appearance of a self-improving artificial general intelligence 
– a godlike mind that will solve all problems (Chalmers, 2010: 1-3). 
5Digital eschatology resembles Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology.  See Peirce (1965): 
secs. 1.175, 1.409-1.416, 6.13, 6.33. 6.189-6.220, 6.490, 7.513-7.515, 8.317-8.318. 
6Paul writes about the progress of the self from glory to glory (2 Cor 3:18).  This progress 
is part of Neo-Irenaean theodicy and is later taken up by Gregory of Nyssa (1979).  It is 
the Eastern doctrine of theosis.  More recently, it is developed by Hick (1976: chs. 20, 
22).  Moravec writes about the progressive engineering of increasingly powerful body-
forms (RBT 144-154, 163-173).  For Kurzweil, evolution makes progress towards the 
divine – towards our idea of maximal perfection (SN 387-390, 476). 
7The Simulation Argument shows that at least one of these is true: “(1) the fraction of 
human level civilizations that reach a post human stage is very close to zero; (2) the 
fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor-simulations is 
very close to zero; (3) the fraction of all people with our kind of experiences who are 
living in a simulation is very close to one.” (Bostrom, 2003: 255).  The Argument does 
not intend to show that option (3) is true, and Bostrom suggests that, given our current 
ignorance, we assign roughly equal probabilities to all three options. 
8Moravec rejects dualism: “mind is entirely the consequence of interacting matter” (MC 
119).  Tipler rejects dualism: “a human being is a purely physical object, a biochemical 
machine completely and exhaustively described by the known laws of physics” (PI 1).  
Kurzweil rejects dualism (ASM 55-65; Kurzweil, 2002: 191-194). Consciousness “does 
not require a world outside the physical world we experience” (2002: 214).  
9Aristotle said that the soul is the form of the body (De Anima, 412a5-414a33).  Modern 
functionalists like Hilary Putnam and Ned Block further develop this theory. 
10Moravec is a patternist.  This involves three points.  First, there is a distinction between 
mathematical patterns and their physical instantiations (MC 116-122; RBT 72-88, ch. 7).  
Second, the soul is the mathematical form of the body (MC 121, 178; RBT 75-77).  
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Third, digital immortality involves physical instantiations of mathematical mind-forms in 
superior physical bodies (MC 108-116; RBT 144-154, 163-173).  Of course, these bodies 
may be made of subtle matter (e.g. energy) rather than gross matter.  But these bodies are 
always physical.  Tipler follows Moravec on the first point (PI 206-213, 227-240); the 
second point (PI 20-43, 124-128); and the third point (PI 241-268).  Kurzweil follows on 
the second (SN 382-388, 458-469, 473-478) and third points (SN 300-330).  On the first 
point, Kurzweil’s patternism looks like an Aristotelian theory of immanent universals. 
11Mind-files play central roles in the soteriologies of the Terasem Movement Foundation 
and the Order of Cosmic Engineers.  The mind-file is not a substantial form; apart from 
some embodiment, it does not think.  It is not a Thomistic soul or a Cartesian res 
cogitans.  It is a file that digitally encodes the mathematical form of the body. 
12It is better for the soul to have a body than to be disembodied.  See Augustine, The City 
of God, Bk XI ch. 23; Bk. XII chs. 16-19; Bk 13 ch. 20; and Bk. XXII ch. 11. 
13Some writers say that digitalism involves gnostic hatred of embodiment and a desire to 
liberate the mind from embodiment (e.g. Wertheim, 2000: 277-282; Hook, 2004; Waters, 
2006).  Since digitalism is resolutely materialistic, these accusations make little sense.  
Although digitalists hate the frailties of the natural body, they do not hate embodiment, 
and they do not desire disembodiment.  Digital theology is not gnostic. 
14The glorified resurrection body has a long history in Christian soteriology.  Paul refers 
to the glorified body (1 Cor 15:35-55).  Augustine discusses glorified bodies (The City of 
God, Bk. XIII Ch. 13; Bk. XIII Ch. 20; Bk. XIII Chs. 22-23; Bk. XIV Ch. 3; Bk. XX; Bk. 
XXI Chs. 2-3; Bk. XXII Chs. 12-21; Bk. XXII Chs. 29-30).  Aquinas discusses the 
glorified body (Summa Theologica, Supplement Q. 79-85; Q 92-93). 
15Kurzweil (SN 300-310) describes the transformation of the natural body into a cyborg 
body.  This is another type of transhuman immortality, but it is not digital. 
16Either this artificial body is a robotic body (MC 108-112; ASM chs. 6 & 7; RBT 144-
154; SN 198-204) or it is an energetic body (PI chs. 9 & 10; ASM 142; RBT 166-173). 
17Uploading resembles the change promised by St. Paul: those who are alive when the last 
trumpet sounds will be become glorified bodies (1 Cor 15:50-55).  For Paul, when Christ 
returns (at the sound of the last trumpet), some Christians will have died while others will 
still be living.  Those who have died will be resurrected; those who are still alive will be 
transformed.  So uploading is like this Pauline transformation. 
18Information-processing is constrained by several finite upper bounds.  The speed of 
light is a finite upper bound on the processing speed.  Quantum mechanics sets a finite 
upper bound on the amount of information that can be stored in any finite amount of 
matter (the Bekenstein bound).  Endless exponential acceleration quickly exceeds these 
finite upper bounds.  Hence it is inconsistent with current physics. 
19Tabulating the opinions of experts is surely a reasonable method for assessing expert 
consensus.  For the PhilPapers Survey, see <http://philpapers.org/surveys/>. 
20Mind uploading depends on computer analogies  (e.g. mind is to body as software to 
hardware).  Several recent Christian writers have used these same analogies for 
resurrection (e.g. Hick, 1976: ch. 15; Reichenbach, 1978; Mackay, 1997). 
21The Bible promises something like archaeological resurrection: “Many of those who 
sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake” (Daniel 12:2 RSV; Isaiah 26:19).  The main 
Biblical models of resurrection involve either the revival of the corpse or the reassembly 
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of the scattered remains of the corpse (Bynum, 1995).  For both revival and reassembly 
theories, resurrection is based on information that remains materially inscribed in the 
universe (e.g. in a corpse, in parts that fit together in some unique way).  Archaeological 
resurrection resembles these two theories. 
22Since there are only finitely many DNA patterns that are in the human species, there are 
only finitely many possible human beings.  And any past civilization contains only 
finitely many humans interacting in finitely complex ways.  See PI 220-225. 
23Most examples of revival in the Bible are revivals of recently deceased corpses.  But 
Paul writes that when you die, your body becomes a seed (1 Cor 15: 35-49).  This seed 
can be thought of as some persistent structure that stores your personal identity. 
24Archaeologists have simulated the Ancient Puebloan civilization in the American 
Southwest (Kohler et al., 2005).  The spatial volume of this simulation is the Long Valley 
(in northeast Arizona); the temporal length is from about 800 to 1300 ACE; the level of 
detail is the household.  The archaeologists watched households appear, move, and 
disappear.  No effort was made to simulate individual people.  There is no data. 
25Brute force resurrection does not seem to have significant Christian parallels.  It might 
be said that the Great Computer (that performs brute force resurrection) is like the God of 
Abraham, who “who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not 
exist” (Rom 4:17, RSV).  However, the promise of the resurrection of all possible 
humans seems to exceed the scope of the Biblical concept of resurrection.  
26Tipler says that the Omega Point (his Great Computer) is infinitely powerful (PI: 249-
250, 265, 462, 505).  It can perform infinitely many operations in finite time.  Hence even 
if there are infinitely many possible societies, the Omega Point can simulate them all. 
27Hick (1976: chs. 15, 20, 22) develops a replication theory of resurrection and Steinhart 
(2008) develops a soteriological counterpart theory of resurrection.  However, both Hick 
and Steinhart say that there must be lawful transference of information. 
28Promotion is like mind-uploading into a body in another universe.  It closely parallels 
Christian resurrection theories that say your resurrection body will appear in some other 
context.   Promotion is like the passage of a person from one dwelling to another (Paul, 2 
Cor 5:1-4).  It has clear affinities with the Thomistic theory of resurrection.  It is like the 
appearance of a resurrection replica in some other universe (e.g. Hick, 1976: ch. 15).   
29To modify the classical cosmological and design arguments, just put the Great 
Computer in place of God.  Many physicists say our universe is computational (see 
Zeilinger, 1999; Lloyd, 2002; Fredkin, 2003).  For the simulation argument, see Bostrom 
(2003). 
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